As I understand the testimony that the committee
received in Washington, the North American Aviation Co. which has
reviewed your specific charges in great detail obviously testified
that you are about half right. That was their testimony, so we can
assume from that you are probably at least half right. There is some
basis, obviously, for the things you have said and charged. I think
that is part of our record in Washington.
Mr. FULTON: May I comment on that? I make no assumptions as
to whether he is right or wrong. I want the corroboration and the
people who will support his testimony as well as the physical facts
that I think we should go into. That is what I was calling to the
witness's attention, what must this committee do to corroborate what
he said. I make no assumption to whether or not he is right or wrong
in whole or in part.
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Gurney.
Mr. GURNEY: Mr. Baron, you mentioned something about the
morale factor in connection with the people who are working on the
Apollo program or here in the spaceport in general. Let us amplify
that a bit. How would you describe this morale?
Mr. BARON: The morale as of less than 3 weeks ago was very
poor and I have never seen the morale since the time I have been with
the company at what anyone would call a normal high point at all. In
other words. you could possibly say it was a "blah" feeling among the
people as far as the morale is concerned.
Mr. GURNEY: This is a serious matter. The morale of people
working, whether it is good or bad, certainly reflects in the quality
of their work. Be more specific. What do you mean by poor? In what
Mr. BARON: In two cases in regard to morale on spacecraft 9,
and spacecraft 11, there has been or there were cases of people who
were shifted to different shifts prior to the launch of these two
separate vehicles. In the case of spacecraft 9, the people did not
get the pay benefits which would normally happen if they were
transferred to another shift. In the case of spacecraft 11, some of
the people got these benefits of the people did not.
Mr. GURNEY: But again, going back to a morale question, it
is a difficult thing to assess. You know in the Army, and most of us
here, spent some time in the service one way or another, we often said
that is a soldier wasn't "bitching real loud" as we put it, there was
something the matter with him. Actually this sort of thing goes on a
good deal. There is morale, and morale. People do get upset and they
complain. But I am saying, do you think that there was a really
serious morale factor with people generally dissatisfied all over the
place with their jobs and what they are doing?
Mr. BARON: I would say for the most part yes, and I would be
more than happy to give you other names of people that you can talk
Mr. GURNEY: Who would they be?
Mr. BARON: Mr. Wade McCrary, who is no longer with us --
these are North American people who have left us -- Mr. Myron Cross,
Mr. Al Miller, Mr. Jack Berger. I think Mr. Berger is still with us.
I don't know for sure. Mr. Dick Menthorn. If I had a list in front
of me, I really could reel them all off to you, but this is what I
have on the top of my head right now.
Mr. GURNEY: Of those who have left, do you know where they
Mr. BARON:Mr. GURNEY: Where ?
Mr. BARON: Mr. Cross is working for Grumman. Mr. McCrary and
Miller are working for Lockheed.
Mr. GURNEY: That is here?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. In this area.
Mr. GURNEY: What would you say was the chief reason for this
lack of morale, as you put it?
Mr. BARON: Well, I think basically personnel treatment and
how some of them were treated and just in general as far as overtime
was concerned. A case in point is two particular instances when I
called in because I was not feeling well and actually not up to par
for working, I called in two particular afternoons that I was going to
stay home that particular day, because I wasn't feeling well, and I
almost was demanded to go to work, and that I would work especially
since I was the only one in that particular area that was working.
This was in the receiving and inspection area.
Mr. GURNEY: The morale factor is connected only with the
North American Corp. Are there others involved?
Mr. BARON: Not that I know of. It is primarily North
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Gurney.
Mr. GURNEY: What about NASA people? Are they involved?
Mr. BARON: I have never really seen them in too bad of a
morale picture at all. They are not contractor workers, they are
government workers. (Laughter.)
Mr. GURNEY: Why do you make this distinction? (Laughter.)
Mr. BARON: Well for the most part, naturally NASA is
supposed to be the controlling outfit in this organization and usually
if a quality Control inspector -- well, normally he is put on the spot
in many cases as to whether he is going to buy something or what, and
then NASA -- the NASA man will turn around and argue the point and
either go or not go with him. I would consider they are one notch
higher mostly, and they don't concern our morale problem.
Mr. GURNEY: With respect again to the morale, you identified
the poor quality of the morale, as you put it, due to shifts in jobs
and uncertainty in jobs. Is that the sort of thing you are talking
Mr. BARON: Yes, actually it is. One case in point again
after spacecraft 9 was launched, we were supposed to have a shift
rotation on a man-for-man basis and for the most part this did not
come about, and it was difficult to get transferred to another shift.
I myself was on a second shift for well over a year. There were many
reasons why I wasn't put on the first shift, because somebody else was
going to school, or some such reason as that. We were limited as to
our amount of people. The person was left in the area in that
particular spot and he just stayed there. Some of these shift changes
were actually put in the desk drawer and forgotten about.
Mr. GURNEY: You mean a request for a shift change?
Mr. BARON: No, the manager supervision, one supervisor made
an attempt to get people's names and what shifts they wanted to go to
but that was usually as far as it ever went.
Mr. GURNEY: Are you saying that it didn't reach the top, is
that the idea?
Mr. BARON: I couldn't know right now whether it reached the
top or it reached the top and it was just shut off or whatever. This
problem is supposed to be still in existence now.
Mr. GURNEY: Are there any particular groups of workers that
you would say were particularly affected by poor morale as you call
Mr. BARON: Well in relation to the receiving and inspection
area at North American, we had several people in there, in fact all
the people in there, that were working there in August and September
and October this last year [i.e., 1966 --Clavius], I don't know
any of them that wanted to stay in. They were all trying to get out
but I guess they were corralled in that particular area and that is
where they stayed. They were not actually receiving inspectors.
Mr. GURNEY: Was this because they didn't like that
particular kind of a job?
Mr. BARON: Well, the receiving inspector job is a labor
grade 6 or 8 or possibly 10 and many of us were top 12 in a particular
area and just didn't have any business being there really, where our
job codes called for other jobs, although this is a vital area.
Mr. GURNEY: But nothing wrong with the treatment of the
people who are doing, this kind of job?
Mr. BARON: Well, I think if you had an interview with
Mr. Wade McCrary about treatment of people, I believe he will give you
a better answer on the subject. He was supposedly acting leadman for
quite some time and had the responsibility of acting leadman and when
he finally challenged the management for his job for leadman, he was
not made leadman, so he left the company.
Mr. GURNEY: One final question: assuming what you say about
morale is true, do you think this affected the work on the job?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. I do.
Mr. GURNEY: In what way?
Mr. BARON: Well, especially in reference to safety,
lackadaisical in some job operations, sleeping on the job, people just
-- a lot of them just didn't care one way or the other and I am not
talking about isolated instances, many times of bookreading and
sleeping and things of this nature.
Mr. GURNEY: That is all.
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Daddario?
Mr. DADDARIO: Mr. Baron, as I take it from the response to
Mr. Gurney's question, you certainly were personally unhappy with the
Mr. BARON: Well, I don't know what you mean by personally
Mr. DADDARIO: You were testifying as to the morale of
others. How did this affect you, individually?
Mr. BARON: Well, I didn't feel too well about the other
people being treated and myself being treated as we were being
treated. I have had a health problem for some time on this particular
contract as a diabetic and if was supposedly difficult for me to work
many of the long hours that I did have to work.
Mr. DADDARIO: This same characteristic that you apply to
others, you agree to, and that there was a bad general overall
condition amongst North American employees?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir.
Mr. DADDARIO: Yet, in your report which I have before me
when your work was terminated with North American you said, "I was
terminated at 4 o'clock that evening. It was a very sorrowful event
for me. There was nothing more that I wanted than to be associated
with the space program."
Mr. BARON: That is correct.
Mr. DADDARIO: How do you tie that in with your previous
Mr. BARON: Which previous statements?
Mr. DADDARIO: Why would it have been a sorrowful event to
leave a program that you wanted to be associated with if, in fact, the
conditions under which you were working were so terrible as you
indicated them to be in answer to Mr. Gurney's question?
Mr. BARON: Regardless of whether or not North American
Aviation treated its people properly, you would still have a job to do
and the bird is up there, and the people are up there, and you have a
task to perform.
Mr. DADDARIO: What was your job?
Mr. BARON: I was a quality control inspector.
Mr. DADDARIO: What did that include and involve?
Mr. BARON: An extensive amount of responsibilities.
Mr. DADDARIO: Well, "extensive", sir, is something that is
hard for me to comprehend under these circumstances.
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir.
Mr. DADDARIO: You had a job as a missile preflight
Mr. BARON: That is what is on my particular record.
Mr. DADDARIO: What were your hours of employment and what
were you supposed to be doing during those hours?
Mr. BARON: When I was a foreman my hours of employment
varied tremendously. They normally were 3:30 in the afternoon until
midnight. I usually reported to work approximately 1 hour early and
in some cases -- well, in many, many cases in the past year or so we
have worked 55- and 60-hour weeks. My job included verifying the
proper installation of components, verifying that tests were being run
per procedure or documented changes, verifying the proper
identification and damage of materials going into the spacecraft and
out to the sites to be used in the ground support work.
Mr. DADDARIO: Where did you do that?
Mr. BARON: What?
Mr. DADDARIO: Where did you work?
Mr. BARON: Location wise, I worked at pad 34 on the complex
and on the gantry. I have worked at pad 16, which is prepressure test
facility, propulsion test facility. I have worked in the life support
area, I have worked in receiving inspection, I have worked in the site
lab or computer room, as we call it. It is a test troubleshooting
area, and I have worked at the MSOB [i.e., Manned Spacecraft
Operations Building. --Clavius] right here at the high bay area on
Mr. DADDARIO: You didn't feel that was a proper designation
for have had another the work that you were doing? You should have
had another designation?
Mr. BARON:It all depends on what outline the personnel will
give you for labor grade 12.
Mr. DADDARIO You said you were an LG-12, but that you
shouldn't have been there. Even though you were designated as that,
you should have been something else. I wonder what idea you had in
mind with reference to your classification?
Mr. BARON: I think in reference to that it was when I was
describing my work at launch complex 34. At that time I was not a top
labor grade 12. It was just several months or a couple months after I
was hired by the company and in some cases the water glycol engineer
would leave the net, then I would be the only one on the net as far as
the blockhouse participant was concerned.
Mr. DADDARIO: You felt that you should have had a higher
classification and greater responsibility?
Mr. BARON: No sir. I felt someone else should be there with
more authority. A labor grade 12 is at the bottom and doesn't have
hardly any authority, and to be left in his hands shouldn't occur.
Mr. DADDARIO: Was it a matter of authority or competency and
experience? Did you feel you had experience to do the job?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. I did.
Mr. DADDARIO: You were dissatisfied not with the job being
properly done on that occasion, because you felt that you personally
had the competence. But you did not have the job classification and
authority to do to go along with it?
Mr BARON: No. That is negative. I felt that the engineer who
was in charge of the test should have stayed on the test, either he or
his NASA counterpart, of which there was no one.
Mr. DADDARIO: You worked at North American for how long?
Mr. BARON: On the Apollo program since September 20, 1965.
Mr. DADDARIO: You started out in what capacity?
Mr. BARON: At the bottom of labor grade 12.
Mr. DADDARIO: You continued in that capacity during the
course of your employment with them, until terminated?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. I was promoted until I got to the top
of labor grade 12.
Mr. DADDARIO: During the course of your employment with
North American you proceeded from a low level 12 to the top level 12.
Were you properly promoted within that period of time?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir.
Mr. HECHLER: Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Hechler.
Mr. HECHLER: Mr. Baron, the Board of Review very
meticulously examined the events leading up to the fire and the Board
conclusively repudiates the allegation that you have carried to this
committee that the astronauts tried for five minutes to get out of the
spacecraft, and this committee heard the last 6 minutes of tape which,
in itself, repudiates this allegation, and I think it is utterly
irresponsible for you to come before this committee and attempt to
dignify a conversation that you had in a drugstore in an effort to set
forth conclusions which have been repudiated by a very thorough
examination of a Board review. I feel it is unfortunate that this has
been brought before the committee. I think this report of the Review
Board speaks for itself. I would just like to ask one or two very
brief questions. Do you know who Mr. Slayton is, Mr. Baron?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. I know who he is.
Mr. HECHLER: Do you know what position he holds in the space
Mr. BARON: Well, not exactly.
Mr. HECHLER: You don't know what position he holds in the
Mr. BARON: You mean direct connection with it?
Mr. HECHLER: Yes.
Mr. BARON: I think I know what he is. Yes, sir. But I don't
know his title.
Mr. HECHLER: Do you know what his first name is?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir -- well, no, sir. I only know and refer
to him as "Deke."
Mr. HECHLER: Do you know how he spells his last name?
Mr. BARON: Yes.
Mr. HECHLER: How does he spell his last name?
Mr. BARON: S-1-a-y-t-o-n, I believe.
Mr. HECHLER: Thank you. I observed on three or four
different occasions you spelled it a different way in the report, and
I just felt that wasn't very good quality control at that point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Fulton.
Mr. FULTON: The question arises on your opportunity to
observe and your qualifications for observation. You were hired by
North American as a labor grade 12, and stayed within that class all
during your service since September 20, 1965, is that correct?
Mr. BARON: That is correct.
MR. FULTON: That is not in a professional nor engineering
category, but a labor category, is it not?
Mr. BARON: What do you classify as labor?
Mr. FULTON: It is a nontechnical qualified engineering or
nonprofessional position, is that not right?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. I think it calls for technically
qualified people, but not anyone with an engineering degree.
Mr. FULTON: Therefore from your previous experience and
education you are not qualified to give in expert opinion on
engineering processes or systems. Is that correct?,
Mr. BARON: No, sir, that is not correct. If I see a
particular indication that is improper, whether or not an engineer
agrees with it, it may be wrong. This has occurred on many occasions
where engineering itself has argued the point. I have won many
arguments on this point, and engineering has. Testing out these
vehicles and systems is no more complicated than running field quality
check on an old B-52 bomber. I was an airman second class,
nontechnical, non-engineering type when I was doing that kind of work.
Mr. FULTON: Is the basis of your criticism in the
engineering procedures either --
Mr. BARON: Would you repeat that question, please?
Mr. FULTON: I will ask the reporter to read the question to
The REPORTER: I didn't understand the question, either.
Would you be good enough to repeat it? (Laughter.)
Mr. FULTON: Is your criticism either of NASA or North
American directed at engineering procedures or systems? I don't
believe it is, is it?
Mr. BARON: In some cases it is, on the water glycol system.
Mr. FULTON: Now, the other point that I would like to
inquire into is your ability to observe or whether your observations
might be colored by your own personal reasons or motives. You have
spoken that you have physical difficulties. What were those physical
difficulties during this time of employment?
Mr. BARON: Mostly from overwork and not being able to go
Mr. FULTON: Well, those are the reasons, but what were the
Mr. BARON: Well, exhaustion would be one of them, tiredness.
Mr. FULTON: Were you under the care of a physician or
physicians, a chiropractor or a psychiatrist at any time during this
Mr. BARON: Which period, sir?
Mr. FULTON: Of your employment since September 20, 1965,
under North American.
Mr. BARON: I have been under a doctor's care quite often.
Mr. FULTON: Who were the doctors?
Mr. BARON: Dr. Chastain of the Jess Parish Hospital or the
Titusville clinic, here.
Mr. FULTON: For what did you see him?
Mr. BARON: Nervous condition.
Mr. FULTON: Is he a doctor or a psychiatrist?
Mr. BARON: He is a doctor, doctor of internal medicine, I
Mr. FULTON: How many times did you see him over this period
for a nervous condition?
Mr. BARON: I saw him on one day. He was an associate of Dr.
Osmond who was treating me as a diabetic and an ulcer.
Mr. FULTON: You have had an ulcer during this time?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir, I most certainly did.
Mr. FULTON: Could your complaints have been caused by the
condition of your ulcer acting on your own feelings?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. I think Dr. Chastain could possibly
verify that the only reason I got the nervous and ulcer condition was
that I was concerned with spacecraft 12.
Mr. FULTON: What other doctor had you seen and for what
Mr. BARON: Prior to that time, Dr. Blackburn in the
Melbourne General Hospital in Melbourne, Fla.
Mr. FULTON: What for?
Mr. BARON: Diabetes.
Mr. FULTON: Who else did you see?
Mr. BARON: A Dr. Killinger at the Holiday Hospital in
Orlando during Christmas of last year [i.e., 1966 --Clavius]
when I was in the hospital.
Mr. FULTON: Why did you see him?
Mr. BARON: It was for a diabetes problem.
Mr. FULTON: Was it anything to do with any problems that
caused physical stress on you and your mind?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. This is one of the reasons why my
diabetes at this particular time was going off kilter, I guess you
Mr. FULTON: Who else did you see during this period?
Mr. BARON: During my hospital stay, you mean, aside from
doctor -- ?
Mr. FULTON: How long were you there? We are trying to get
your medical history to see what power you had to observe.
Mr. WYDLER: Would it be possible for Mr. Baron to submit it
for the record? We don't want to listen to every doctor he has ever
seen in his life.
Mr. FULTON: I want to know if his observations were made
from a capacity which is unbiased or uncolored by his physical
condition. I think that information would contribute to the hearing.
Would you quickly give me another one or two?
Mr. BARON: That is all the doctors I had seen lately. I
talked to Dr. Hare, the astronauts' doctor, I believe, or one of them
on the staff.
Mr. FULTON: Was that for a physical condition or a mental
Mr. BARON: I wouldn't know. It was after the inquiry board
hearing. And I took it as a psychiatric examination.
Mr. FULTON: Was there any report given on that?
Mr. BARON: No, sir, not that I know of.
Mr. FULTON: Was it an extensive examination?
Mr. BARON: No, sir, it was a half-hour conversation with him
about problems on the spacecraft, and I believe he went into some
personal things also.
Mr. FULTON: Your problems, too?
Mr. BARON: That is correct.
Mr. FULTON: So that both you and your mind and the
spacecraft had problems, didn't you?
Mr. BARON: I think we all have our own problems. (Laughter.)
The spacecraft definitely had its problems.
Mr. FULTON: That is all.
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Baron, if things were really as bad as you
pictured them by the things that, you have said to this committee in
your report, do you believe we would ever have gotten a shot off to
the moon? Do you think we ever would have had one successful shot?
Mr. BARON: Certainly, sir.
Mr. TEAGUE: With the conditions you pictured here, do you
think we could be successful in any of our shots?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. No, sir. I don't think so.
Mr. TEAGUE: We have had a lot of successes?
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir, you have. But not on the Apollo
Mr. TEAGUE: Mr. Wydler.
Mr. WYDLER: I just want to get very clear about that one
doctor that you told us about. You say that a doctor from NASA talked
to you about something or other. How did that come about? Did you
ask to see them, or did he request you to talk to him, or what?
Mr. BARON: Mr. Wydler, since I discussed this report with
the first man I ever met in the hospital back in November, I had a
NASA man in the hospital with me over here as a roommate for a 24-hour
period. I had a NASA man in the Orlando hospital talk to me about the
same problems I am discussing right now. When I was transferred over
there he showed up the next day and talked to me for two days. I also
saw Mr. John Brooks over at the Orlando hospital. He was an
investigator from Washington headquarters in NASA. He held an
interview with me over there. When I got back home after the accident
had occurred, I was called to meet with the inquiry board. I believe
there was nine of them there, one of the subboards, and Dr. Hare was
there also, and he wanted to have a half hour or so private session
with me after the board left, which he did have, and he indicated to
me certainly that he was delving into personal problems of my own,
asking me about them -- well, it was another case of a NASA man
talking to me about the same problems.
Mr. WYDLER: Did he say he was acting on anybody's behalf or
on NASA's behalf, or on the review board's behalf ?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. Only one NASA man, Mr. Brooks, said
this. No one said they were acting on behalf of any board.
Mr. WYDLER: Let me understand this. Do all these matters of
deficiencies, as you express them in this program relate directly to
matters of safety? I know in a broad sense they all relate to
safety. But, if you can tell us, do any of them relate to matters of
what we could call immediate safety to the crew of the spacecraft?
Mr. BARON: No, sir.
Mr. WYDLER: Let me ask you one final question: You know,
Exhibit A here is the picture I had asked some questions about to the
witnesses from NASA and North American that were here just before you.
Do you know anything about the wire which is theorized to be the wire
that is guilty of causing this fire?, Do you know anything regarding
its installation, its inspection, or anything that might throw some
light on this particular wire, the lithium door, or anything of that
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir, I do. But, here, again, it is
something that has been referred to me by another individual, and if I
do bring it up, I dislike being called irresponsible in making any of
these comments to you. People have to understand, especially this
committee, that these people could not say anything to anybody about
this thing when it did occur. I happened to have been terminated the
day I got back to work. I wasn't out for allowing these people here
-- I got a lot of anonymous calls from people about troubles on the
spacecraft prior and immediately prior to the fire. These people that
I discussed it with knew they were jeopardizing their jobs if they
were caught talking to me or got discussing something they got out of
the news. This is how the company feels about it, naturally.
Mr. WYDLER: You say you don't know anything about this
personally, but you are indicating somebody might have said something
to you about it, is that right?
Mr. BARON: Definitely.
Mr. WYDLER: You don't feel that you want to discuss that
with the committee at this time?
Mr. BARON: I Would be more than happy to say it, if
Mr. Hechler would take a more objective view of the statements.
Mr. WYDLER: I can't answer for Mr. Hechler, but I would like
to hear it.
Mr. BARON: Yes, sir. I will be more than happy to.
Mr. WYDLER: Please tell us.
Mr. BARON: I discussed it with another individual at his
home, and he witnessed one evening when he was working, three
technicians who were supposed to flush out, this is by purging the
environmental control unit with an alcohol solution to apparently
clean it and get it ready for proper use. He disclosed to me that a
55-gallon drum had been delivered to the site. I guess it was right
here at MSOB. I don't know for sure. I guess it was -- a 55-gallon
drum of 190-proof alcohol that was delivered to them. The three men
who were assigned to flushing this unit out were -- well, one of them
took a five-gallon jug of this stuff home and one other, or perhaps
all three of them, I don't really recall right now, had mixed this
stuff and cut it with water and were drinking it right here at the
site, and they were carrying it around in plastic bags.
Mr. WYDLER: Well, that doesn't have anything to do with this
particular wire or this particular door.
Mr. BARON: Possibly so, because they were working on that
unit and the spacecraft, and this is the only link I could put between
them, between what you have there and the drinking.
Mr. FULTON: Would you yield? I want to say who, when, and
Mr. WYDLER: I just want to finish this up, if I could. Mr.
Baron, I notice one other thing under life support you pointed out in
your report. It is our report of your report, on page 17. It does
relate to spacecraft 12 and you were talking about the fuel tank being
worked on without any paperwork and so forth. Would this have
anything to do with the wire or lithium door that we are talking about
Mr. BARON: No, sir.
Mr. WYDLER: That is all.
Mr. FULTON: When you are speaking about people, it naturally
raises the question, who, when, and where. Who was there to observe
Mr. BARON: The same gentleman is Mr. Holmburg that disclosed
that information to me. That is the only name I know. And I have
related to Mr. Wydler exactly what he related to me.
Mr. FULTON: This Mr. Holmburg was not involved in this
situation, was he? He was simply the relay of hearsay of what went
on, wasn't he?
Mr. BARON: That is right, sir.
Mr. FULTON: I would like to make clear that this committee
has no official position with regard to you nor have I said anything
favorably or unfavorably about your testimony. I certainly want to
inquire and get corroboration so we can determine the correctness and
the truth of your statements. If you will cooperate with this
committee, and with the chairman's permission, put into the record any
further suggestions of witnesses, times, or events we can look into,
outside of the report, which we have all read, please let us hear.
Mr. BARON: Which report was that, sir?
Mr. FULTON: The original report.
Mr. BARON: I have sent to the chairman of this committee a
more through report which includes all the names.
Mr. FULTON: I have all the names, but I read them and said
to myself, who should we call?
Mr. BARON: No, sir. You are talking about the 55-page
report. I am talking about the 500-page report.
Mr. TEAGUE: Your report went to the chairman of the full
committee [i.e., Rep. George P. Miller, Chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics. --Clavius], not to me. He
told me he received it.
Mr. BARON: I have a 500-page report. I have an opening
statement which I wanted to read, which described this 500-page
report, and in this I think you can get all the possible names that
there are, the times, the dates, the tests that were being run and the
internal letters of the company, proper specifications, especially in
regard to flamability of materials. All this is in this new report.
Mr. FULTON: When did you start to take such a serious and
active interest in what you felt was what you felt was wrong and kept
such detailed records? Why did you do it? Why didn't you refer it to
someone else within your company who had responsibility to
Mr. BARON: This was done. I started working for this
company in September 1965. I started taking notes in November of 1965
when I was assigned to the pad 34 complex. All my daily notes and
many, many more letters and reports I had made out were sent up
through my headman and through assistant supervision. If they did not
get through to the top, then I don't know what happened to the notes
and letters. But they were sent up. The information in either of my
reports were given to North American on a time-to-time basis, on a
daily basis, practically. I used to run my supervisor out of these
forms because I had so many letters, because I used to write so many
of these letters about discrepant actions.
Mr. FULTON: Did other people who were working with you do
this, too, or were you the only one?
Mr. BARON: I don't believe anybody did it to the extent that
I did it, sir.
Mr. FULTON: That is all, sir.
Mr. WYDLER: Could I suggest that if Mr. Baron has some
concluding remarks, or if he would like to submit a statement for the
record, that he may be afforded an opportunity? I see you have
something before you, and perhaps you would like to put it in.
Mr. BARON: I think I have covered most of it. I have the
report that I would like to be submitted as a part of the record, the
Mr. WYDLER: That means printing it. That is something we
should leave to the committee, something of that length, whether we
want to print it as part of the public documents. We can take it as
an exhibit. Whether we will print it as part of the public record is
something we should decide after we see it. Is that all right with
Mr. BARON: Yes.
Mr. TEAGUE: I think we are through with you. The Board has
found some of the things you have said to be true. What you have done
has caused North American to search their procedures. Thank you very
Mr. BARON: Thank you.
[Mr. Holmburg's testimony
immediately follows in the same hearing. --Clavius]